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Abstract
The following analysis attempts to resituate discussion about legal
education within the context of modem professionalism and the social
history of American education.1
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INTRODUCTION

The following analysis attempts to resituate discussion about legal
education within the context of modem professionalism and the social
history of American education.1 Particular focus is given to the rise of
clinical instruction in legal education during the period after 1870.2
Section One reviews the genesis of clinical education at the
Harvard Medical School after 1870. Section Two reveals how the case
method of legal instruction was introduced as a clinical form of education at the Harvard Law School during the same period. Section Three
confronts the reasons why the case method of law teaching has failed to
be designated "clinical" instruction during the past fifty years. Section
Four demonstrates the close relationship between the rise of the case
method law school and the modernization of professional culture. Section Five displays the dynamic self-consciousness of Harvard's leadership in creating the new model law school which set an example for all
others. Section Six concludes with an evaluation of the need for regarding legal education as a social relation.
* B.A., Wisconsin, 1972; J.D., Wayne State, 1978; LL.M. Harvard Law School,
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would like to express my appreciation to Professors Elizabeth Mensch, Morton Hor-
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the manuscript.
1. See M. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

(1977); B. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALSIM (1976); S. Cohen, "The
History of the History of American Education, 1900-1976: The Uses of the Past" 46
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2. See A. Chase, The Birth of the Modern Law School, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIS329 (1979), an introduction to the genesis of case method instruction.
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I. MEDICAL EDUCATION
In his outline history of the Harvard Medical School, published in
1930, Dr. Frederick C. Shattuck indicates that up until Charles W.
Eliot's appointment as President of Harvard University in 1869, the
lectures offered to students at the Harvard Medical School were essentially designed to supplement the prevailing practice of apprenticeship
"whereby a student attached himself to an older physician and thus
learned the art from practical training."' Although most historical
writing on medical education at Harvard immediately after 1870 constitutes, in essence, a catalogue of the dramatic changes which Eliot
brought about in the school, it can be fairly stated that his whole reform program represented a kind of compromise between the lecture
and treatise method and the autonomous apprentice system. The result
was the first modern professional school of medicine in America.4
Drs. Henry K. Beecher and Mark D. Altschule, in their recent
history of medicine at Harvard, characterize the situation confronted
by Eliot:
Until Eliot arrived on the administrative scene in 1869, the Harvard
Medical School was a poor thing, unworthy to be associated with
Harvard College... Each candidate for a degree was obliged to buy
tickets to each of the courses for at least one year. Twice a week there
was a 'clinical medical visit' at the Massachusetts General Hospital for
one hour, and on Saturday morning an operative session. (Of the 127
students attending, 31 held a college degree.) There was no gradation of
studies, no laboratories, no private courses, no individual instruction.
There were two courses of lectures of four months each. The remainder
of the students' work was, theoretically at least, supervised by the
outside instructors to whom the students were apprenticed, more or less,
for three years. How much this apprenticeship amounted to depended
upon the habits and inclinations of the instructor involved. It might be
great or it might be essentially useless. Some students were able to see
many cases of disease, and some none at all. In the crucial year of 1871
the three-year graded course was adopted and the apprenticeship

3. F. Shattuck & J. L. Bremer, The Medical School, 1869-1929 in THE
OPMENT OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY SINCE THE INAUGURATION

DEVEL-

OF PRESIDENT ELIOT

1869-1929 555 (1930).
4. See Chase, supra note 2, at 340-42, especially note 53.
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terminated.5

Rather than constituting a stride away from the concrete and the
practical in medical education, however, Eliot's termination of the apprentice system revealed his desire to bring direct experience with patients within the controlled and regularized structure of university medical education where it could be made systematic and could also be
guaranteed. Just as the lecture and treatise method of teaching gradually lost force in the Harvard Law School during Eliot's presidency, the
same method was gradually cut back in the medical school as well. It is
precisely the bringing of direct and practical experience with patients
from the realm of informal apprenticeship into the controlled environment of university professional education which constitutes the genesis
of clinical instruction in American pedagogy. Apprenticeship is uneven
and mundane while clinical education is sophisticated and special.
Addressing the Medical Society of the State of New York in 1896,
Eliot commented on the instructional changes which he brought about
in the Harvard Medical School:
Thirty years ago there were only two laboratories in the Harvard
Medical School - a dissecting-room, in which the manners and customs
were as rough and unwholesome as the room and its accessories, and a
little chemical laboratory in which no one was required to work. A small
minority of the students voluntarily sought some laboratory training in
chemistry. In our present medical school laboratory work of many sorts
demands a large part of the student's attention. There are laboratories in
finatomy, medical chemistry, physiology, histology, embryology, pathology, and bacteriology; and in all these some work is prescribed, and additional work is done by many. In clinical teaching, moreover, the change
is great. Formerly a large group of students accompanied a visiting physician on his rounds at the hospital, and saw what they could under very
disadvantageous conditions. Now instruction has become, in many
clinical departments, absolutely individual, the instructor dealing with
one student at a time, and personally showing him how to see, hear, and
touch for himself in all sorts of difficult observation and manipulation.
Much instruction is given to small groups of students, three or four at a
time - no more than can actually see and touch for themselves. A four
5. H. BEECHER & M. ALTSCHULE, MEDICINE AT HARVARD: THE FIRST THREE
HUNDRED YEARS 90-91 (1977).
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years' course of training such as I have described has a high degree of
training-power both for the senses and the reason. The old medical
teaching was largely exposition; it gave information at long range about
things and processes which were not within reach or sight at the moment. The new medical education aims at imparting manual and ocular
skill, and cultivating the mental powers of close attention through prolonged investigations at close quarters with the facts, and of just reasoning on the evidence.6
This long statement of Eliot's pedagogical faith in the concrete
and the practical as the basis of true education reveals his hostility to
the lecture and treatise method ("the old medical teaching") which be
sought to undercut throughout university instruction. Even in the college, Eliot replaced the "plain lecture, without carefully organized
aids," 7 with one supplemented by prescribed reading, periodic written
examinations, frequent recitations, and careful surveillance of student
production and performance by younger faculty.
"While some spoke nostalgically of training systems that prevailed
in the early nineteenth century," writes historian James Gilbert
not every observer had the same feelings. As Charles Eliot of Harvard
noted, the fashion of studying medicine by caring for the doctor's horse
and buggy or the study of law by copying deeds was, happily, gone forever. There were 'better ways of studying medicine or law, namely, by
going to professional school, where progressive, systematic instruction
rapidly developed is to be had.' 8
Thus Eliot's contribution to modern professional education consisted of a struggle on two fronts: against the expository lecture tradition in the schools, on the one hand, and against the independent apprenticeship outside the schools, on the other. The development of
laboratory, clinical, and case method instruction in the professional
schools ("cultivating the mental powers of close attention through pro6. C. Eliot, Medical Education of the Future, (Address before the Medical Society of the State of New York, January 28, 1896), reprinted in EDUCATIONAL REFORM
347-48 (1898).
7. C. ELIOT, UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATION 180 (1908).
8.

J.

GILBERT, WORK WITHOUT SALVATION: AMERICA'S INTELLECTUALS AND

INDUSTRIAL ALIENATION,

1880-1910, at 60 (1977).
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longed investigations at close quarters with the facts, and of just reasoning on the evidence") 9 dealt a fatal blow to both the lecture and
treatise academies and the apprentice system. Neither of the latter
could guarantee direct student participation in the professional project
as well as systematic and comprehensive instruction.
As Eliot knew, clinical education had developed within French
medicine during the Revolution of 1789 as a compromise between the
"Gothic universities and aristocratic academies" whose lecture system
had trained French doctors under the ancient regime, and the temporary experiment in total liberty under which there was no organization
of or control over professional education in medicine. 10 In a very interesting passage concerning the birth of the clinic, Michel Foucault
points out:
On what was the distinction based among those practising the art of
healing? The most important part of the training of an officer of health
was his years of practice,which might be as many as six; the doctor, on
the other hand, complemented his theoretical training with clinical experience. It was no doubt this difference between the practical and the
clinical that was the most innovatory factor in the legislation of the Year
XI. The practice required of the officer of health was a controlled empiricism: a question of knowing what to do after seeing; experience was
integrated at the level of perception, memory, and repetition, that is, at
the level of the example. In the clinic, it was a question of a much more
subtle and complex structure in which the integration of experience occurred in a gaze that was at the same time knowledge, a gaze that exists,
that was master of its truth, an4 free of all example, even if at times it
had made use of them. Practice would be opened up to the officers of
health, but the doctors would reserve the initiation into the clinic to
themselves.1 1
Thus, marvellously Janus-faced since its inception within the European bourgeoisie's, struggle against the older order, the clinic
presented itself as practical and popular in relation to the old lecture
academies as well as transcendent and knowledgable when confronted
by the radically democratic effort to completely destroy restrictions
9. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
10. See Chase, supra note 2, at 343-44.
11. M. FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF THE CLINIC 81-82 (1973).
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upon professional entry. It was just this sort of passage which Charles
Eliot attempted to steer for clinical medicine through the competing
obstacles of the entrenched lecture faculties in the schools and the surviving apprentice tradition among practitioners of the art. Against apprenticeship, the contrast would be drawn between art and science, between artisans and professionals. Against the established schools, the
contrast was between mental laxity and rigour, between abstract theory
12
and the kind of judicious reasoning courted by practical men.
Although the early victories won by clinical instruction at the
Harvard Medical School made it the model for all subsequent medical
education in the United States, the medical school never achieved during the nineteenth century or early twentieth the kind of preeminence
secured by the Harvard Law School. The reason was simply that the
medical school failed to develop its own teaching hospital (or relations
with Boston medical facilities) which would have permitted the clinical
program to fully blossom.
Dr. Shattuck observed at a meeting of the Boston Society for
Medical Improvement in 1900 that "(t)he fact that the Harvard Medical School has no hospital of its own, not even an out-patient clinic, is
an obtrusive fact. However welcome, the school is still a guest of the
hospitals and must adapt itself to rules and regulations which are not
necessarily uniform." I s Thirty years later, after favorable relations had
been developed with the Massachusetts General Hospital and Boston
Children's Hospital, and an Out-Patient Department was set up in one
of the school buildings, Shattuck remarked that the construction of Peter Bent Brigham Hospital signaled the eventual resolution of the
clinical teaching problem at Harvard. The school's potential was finally
realized.14
The significance of Eliot's successful struggle against both the old
Harvard medical faculty and the surviving apprentice system cannot be
sufficiently emphasized. In spite of their apparent recognition of the
disastrous state of medical apprenticeship afte the Civil War,' 5
12.

See Chase supra note 2, at 336-40. See also the text of sections II and V

infra.
13.

F. Shattuck, Reports of Societies: Boston Society for Medical Improvement,

142 B. MED. & SURGICAL J. 567, 568 (1900).
14. See Shattuck, supra note 3, at 569-80.
15. See Beecher & Altschule, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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Beecher and Altschule nevertheless make the following inexplicable
argument:
Eliot had two definite avenues in mind for the rehabilitation of the
Harvard Medical School. Both had to do with quality: of students and of
the teaching. . . . In the second category he intended to eliminate the
apprenticeship. Although these goals seemed laudable then, with the passage of time the second has been found to be not entirely sound. It is a
curious thing that the apprentice system was (and sometimes still is) spoken of in terms of disdain, yet it still cares for at least 50 percent of
medical education through the four to six years of intern and resident
programs. The difference is that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the student was guided usually by a single preceptor, whereas in the
late nineteenth and twentieth centuries there were and are multiple
preceptors for each student. The principle is the same, and the difference
is not important.16
On the contrary, the principles underlying apprenticeship and
modern clinical medicine are not the same. As Eliot understood perfectly, the difference was of extraordinary importance. Guided by a single preceptor, as even Beecher and Altschule seem to agree, in the
nineteenth century meant often enough that the medical student was
not guided at all. Yet professional supervision and individual instruction were for Eliot essential to clinical teaching. Under a single practitioner, what range of cases could a student hope to see? Only clinical
experience in university hospitals and laboratories could secure systematic and comprehensive instruction. Indeed, doctors trained under the
apprentice system frequently lacked even the manual and ocular skills
necessary to carry out a diagnostic examination, given the advance of
17
medical science and clinical instruction by the turn of the century.
Having indicated that Eliot terminated apprenticeships for
Harvard Medical students in 1871, Beecher and Altschule then assert
that the apprentice system "still cares for at least 50 percent of medical
education through the four to six years of intern and resident programs."1' 8 Thus, the authors seem uncertain of what they mean by "ap-

16. Id. at 93-94.
17. See Eliot, supra note 6 and accompanying text.

18. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
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prenticeship." The relation between clinical rotations and clinical residencies, between medical schools, teaching hospitals and the medical
profession appears to have rather little in common with the old apprenticeship training. Modern clinical medicine may be described as just
one more version of apprenticeship only if one is willing to remove the
designation "clinical" from its historical context and allow it to represent any educational system whatsoever, so long as there is at least
some direct patient exposure involved. As in Foucault's illustration
drawn from French medicine, 19 what was significant about clinical
medical instruction was not what it had in common with apprenticeship
(i.e., practical experience) but the way in which it was different: the
clinic brought first hand training "for the senses and the reason" within
the systematically organized and controlled space of professional
institutions.
II. LEGAL EDUCATION
Initially, the clinical form of medical instruction at Harvard was
presented as a model for the case method's development. 20
When defending the case method of instruction in the law school
by comparing it to clinical instruction in the medical school, President
Eliot urged that the analog within legal education to the hospital in
medical education was not the court or law office, but rather the law
library; law books were to the law student what the bodies of the sick
and wounded were to the medical student. Only systematic study of
case reports and their mode of reasoning could provide the law student
with a professional education. This was implicitly, of course, an expression of contempt for the legal apprenticeship system whereby students
prepared for the bar by studying in the office of a practicing attorney.
Students, observed Eliot, who should habitually spend their time in
courts or law offices would waste it. Like clinical instruction in
medicine, the case method of teaching law constituted a compromise
between the prevailing lecture and treatise method in the schools and
the apprenticeship system outside the schools. Indeed, by bringing together cultivation of "mental powers of close attention through pro-

19. See Foucault, supra note 11 and accompanying text.
20. See Chase, supra note 2, at 333-36, 341-43, especially note 54.
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longed investigations at close quarters with the facts"2 with a systematically organized institutional framework, the case method could be
conceived as clinical instruction in law.
That the case method was perceived (following Eliot's analogy) to
constitute clinical education in law is suggested by one critique of the
method, advanced by an opponent. Professor Christopher G. Tiedeman
of the Law Department of the University of the City of New York
developed his analysis in the first volume of The Yale Law Journal.A
special issue, published in 1892, was devoted to the increasingly controversial debate over "methods of legal education."
"Like the student of the different sciences," remarked Tiedeman,
the law student must learn how to make original investigations for himself, and diagnose, so to speak, the principles of law from the cases in
actual litigation. But no reason can be given why he must learn the
whole science of the law by his own investigations in the undigested mass
of raw material in the shape of adjudicated cases. 2
Tiedeman further argued that because students of clinical medicine
had not been altogether denied the treatises within which previous research was recorded, law students under the case method should not be
denied the use of "theoretic" or treatise material within their studies.
This illustrates how far the case books had come to be the exclusive
classroom textbooks under case method instruction.2
Tiedeman felt the issue was one of "finding the middle and true
ground of a controversy":
Impressed by the defects of the older systems of instruction, in
which the law student was presented with more or less abstract propositions of law, with the aid of textbooks, which often were either nothing
more than digests of the cases, and put together in an illogical and disorderly manner, or whose statements of the law were so loose and inaccurate as to prove misleading; and more impressed with the necessity of
'legal clinics' in the course of instruction in the law school instead of
being left for acquisition in the law office, the advocates of instruction by
21. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
22. C. Tiedeman, Methods of Legal Education III, 1
(1892).
23. See notes 30 & 31 infra and accompanying text.
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cases have gone to the opposite extreme or placing too high a value upon
the study of cases, and of unduly depreciating the value of the study of
law, apirt from learning it through the medium of practical
theoretic
24
law.
Thus, Tiedeman acknowledges the improvements made by the case
method law school and perceives the inadequacy of the previous abstract presentation in the old law schools, on the one hand, and of leaving the study cases to the law offices, on the other. He fully appreciates
the kind of compromise which the case method law school represents.
Yet Tiedeman asserts that, in effect, a good thing has been carried
too far. Without questioning the consolidation of professional legal education within the schools or the wisdom of placing case reports at the
center of legal study, Tiedeman urges that secondary or discursive work
should no more be eliminated from clinical legal education than it had
been in clinical medical education. He concludes:
The advocates of instruction by the use of cases have effected an
important reform in legal education by arousing the law schools of the
country to the importance of infusing more life into their instruction, and
of introducing into their curricula what I would call 'legal clinics',2 and
5
for this great good the legal profession should be grateful to them.
Like a scientist or doctor, the law student needed to learn to 'diagnose' principles of law from case reports. Many observers of American
legal education, doubting that law constitutes a science in any rigorous
way,26 have failed to recognize the relationship between clinical or laboratory instruction and case method teaching. The relationship was less
between law and science than between systematic instruction in law
and systematic instruction in medicine or the scientific disciplines.
What these departments of the university had in common was their
uniformly practical and systematic professional organization under
President Eliot. Scientific study referred to practical and concrete instruction within a rationalized professional institution which shunned

24.

Tiedeman, supra note 22, at 156-57.

25. Id. at 157.
26. See text at sections IV and V infra.
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everything arbitrary and local (i.e., apprenticeship).2
Part of the confusion on this issue no doubt stems from the indirect form in which the case method was analogized by its sponsors to
clinical instruction. Eliot, for example, analogized the law library (not
the case method itself) to the hospital in clinical medicine.2 8 Dean
Christopher Langdell deployed a similar metaphor thirteen years later:
[It] was indispensable to establish at least two things; first that law
is a science; secondly, that all the available materials of that science are
contained in printed books. . . . If it be not a science, it is a species of
handicraft, and may be learned by serving an apprenticeship to one who
practices it. . . . But if printed books are the ultimate sources of all
legal knowledge; if every student who would obtain any mastery of law
as a science must resort to these ultimate sources; and if the only assistance which it is possible for the learner to receive is such as can be
afforded by teachers who have travelled the same road before him, - then
a university, and a university alone, can furnish every possible facility for
teaching and learning law. . . We have also constantly inculcated the
idea that the library is the proper workshop of professors and students
alike; that it is to us all that the laboratories of the university are to the
chemists and physicists, all that the museum of natural history is to the
29
zoologists, all that the botanical garden is to the botanists.
Langdell's remarks may be read as an effort to bestow upon the
law a conceptual character identical to that of the physical and biological sciences; in that event, the relation between the law school and the
scientific and medical departments of the university might appropriately be viewed as one whose nature Langdell misunderstood. But
Langdell was as committed as Eliot to the construction of universitybased, professional legal education. If the practice of law was not a
handicraft, and systematic professional education could not be secured
through apprenticeship, then it would become necessary to regard law
as a university science.
Eliot and Langdell both know well enough that the law library was
27. See note 108 infra and accompanying text.
28. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
29. C. Langdell, Record of the Commemoration, November fifth to eighth, 1886,
on the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the founding of Harvard College 97-98
(1887) (quoted in A.
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not the proper workshop of professional legal education nor were the
printed books which were, in effect, the laboratory manuals 0 of case
method teaching to be found in the library. Eliot made this point
clearly in his description of the case method's development at Harvard:
Professor Langdell's fundamental idea was that the law should be
taught, not from treatises or from lectures which would probably be either imperfect treatises or commentaries on treatises, but at first hand
from the records of actual cases in which important principles or practices had been laid down and established by judicial tribunals .... It
soon appeared that it was highly inconvenient for the many students to
get timely access to the few copies of the reports to which Professor
Langdell referred them, and he therefore undertook the preparation of a
collection of select cases on contracts. This selection was followed in a
few years by a series of volumes of select cases on the subjects of instruction in the Harvard Law School, almost all of which were prepared by
Professor Langdell's colleagues; and his method was gradually adopted
by most of the teachers in the School. The possession of these volumes of
cases makes it unnecessary for the student to resort incessantly to the
volumes of reports on the library shelves, unless the professors revise
their selections of cases, or wish to add cases of a date later than that of
the volumes in use. 1
Thus it was primarily with their casebooks (rather than in the library) that law students prepared for classes and it was in the case
method classroom itself (Tiedeman's 'legal clinics') where students not
only demonstrated but in fact developed "the mental powers of close
attention through prolonged investigations at close quarters with the
facts, and of just reasoning on the evidence." 82 Langdell's fundamental
idea (as Eliot indicates) was that law should be taught systematically
from concrete cases, by "teachers who have travelled the same road," 33
and only in rationally organized, national professional schools."
Langdell sought to steer the same course as Eliot between the ab-

30. See Chase, supra note 2, at 332-336.
31. ELIOT, EDUCATIONAL REFORM 199-201 (1898).

32. See note 6 supra and accompanying text. *
33. See note 29 supra and accompanying text. See also notes 61 & 81 infra and
accompanying text.
34. See note 108 infra and accompanying text.
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stract, expository lecture and treatise tradition and the artisan apprentice system, neither of which could guarantee a professional education.
His and Eliot's definition of scientific discipline itself may have been
exhausted by the kind of systematic and concrete instruction which
everywhere came to supersede the conservative academies and discredited apprenticeship tradition as the fundamental organizing structure of
modern professionalization. As one of Langdell's early students later
made plain in The American Law Register:
In order to judge of Professor Langdell's success it is necessary to keep
clearly in mind what was his aim. He asserted and believed that law is a
science, but his vital proposition (for the purpose of weighing his work as
a teacher) is not that law is a science, but that there is a scientific
method of teaching and studying the law.35

III. THE REAL CLINIC IN LAW
Skepticism regarding the status of law as a science frequently amplifies a casual inattention to the relation between case method instruction and clinical education. For those less hostile to the association of
law and science, misconceiving the law library as the laboratory of legal education has also contributed to the obscurity of the case method's
role as clinical instruction in law.
Law librarian Edward F. Hess, Jr., for example, introduces the
1977 University of Illinois College of Law Law Library Guide with the
following statement: "Beyond any other group on the campus law students make use of the library as the heart and soul of their education.
It is trite but nevertheless true to say that the Law Library is the counterpart of the laboratory in medical or scientific education." 3 So long
as the law library is superficially apprehended as the law school's laboratory, the real link between case instruction and clinical teaching will
be rendered less visible. Indeed, for the past fifty years the reference to
clinical teaching in the law schools has oddly been reserved to survivals
35. W. Schofield, Christopher Columbus Langdell 55 O.S. 46 N.S. THE AMERI281 (1907).
36. E. HESS, Introduction to UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS COLLEGE OF LAW: LAW
LIBRARY GUIDE (August 1977).
CAN LAW REGISTER
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and rediscoveries of various kinds of apprenticeship.
Thus, during the 1930s, Jerome Frank was able to attack the case
method law school (in behalf of what might be described as a regression to a form of apprentice system) and call his alternative a "clinical
lawyer school."137 It is not unreasonable to argue that because Frank
continued to feel that legal education should be confined to professional
schools, his option was not so much a reversion to apprenticeship as it
was a refinement of the modern professional school, with a greater tilt
toward the "concrete and practical" (or perhaps a different conception
of what was, after all, "practical").
Yet Frank seems not to have sensed at all the relationship between
Langdell's (and Eliot's) transformation of the Harvard Law School and
the development of systematic instruction throughout professional education. In perceiving the case method as fundamentally arcane rather
than systematic and practical (in relation, alternatively, to the apprenticeship and the lecture method), Frank seems hardly to have understood the successful professional institution which he was criticizing
and within whose ideological terrain he would have to justify his reforms so long as he believed law school should remain selective points
of entry to the profession.
Certainly Frank was right to argue that the law schools did not
provide their graduates with many practical skills essential to the practice of law. But the new professional schools did not pretend to provide
that sort of training. However concrete and practical clinical instruction might be, it did not duplicate the character of merely artisan training. As Foucault points out 8 clinical instruction was a species apart, a
form of simultaneously direct and mediated experience, less a kind of
artisan training than initiation into professional life.39
The following observation by Boalt Hall Professor Preble Stolz
from a 1969 paper on the failure of "clinical experience" in American
legal education typifies the conceptual reduction of clinical instruction
to merely artisan or practical experience, and its total divorce (as a
term of reference) from the case method:
37.

See J. Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyers-School 81 U. PA. L. REv. 907

(1933). See also Chase, supra note 2, at 330-31.
38.
39.

See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
In reference to the notion of "initiation", see Chase, supra note 2, at 344.
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Modern legal education in this country begins at Harvard in 1870,

but it was not until about the turn of the century that the model Langdell created at Cambridge began to be copied generally. Legal clinics

have been associated with law schools since that time. As the name suggests, they were conceived on analogy to the medical school clinic where
medical students were given exposure to sick people in the context of

practice rather than the classroom. Clinical experience rapidly became a
central part of medical education but a comparable kind of exposure to
the real world of law practice, although repeatedly tried, has never been
40

anything more than a fringe activity in legal education. Why?

Stolz answers his question with two assertions: first, "until quite recently clinical or practical experience ranked very low in the value
structure of legal educators";"' and second, uncertainty about the appropriate "form of the non-classroom experience, ' 42 given the poor reputation of "legal aid" bureaus, etc., has discouraged the development of
clinical legal education.
At least Stolz's first sentence is correct: the case method originated
as the fundamental organizing principle of an entire law school at
Harvard, as we have pointed out.43 Yet Stolz places the birth of "legal
clinics" thirty years later, and seems unaware of the earlier characterization of the case method as a "legal clinic" and as the appropriate
equivalent to the medical school clinic or hospital. He seems to equate
clinical education in medicine with apprenticeship, not realizing that
the clinic stands precisely between the classroom (the old lecture
method) and practice (the daily rounds of a practicing physician).
Coming at the turn of the century, then, what actually did constitute Stolz's "legal clinics"? He explains in a footnote: "There were student-organized 'Dispensaries' at the University of Pennsylvania and at
Harvard before the turn of the century. '44 Now if the case method has
been introduced at Harvard as a clinical or laboratory way of teaching
law, a kind of legal clinic, and a very different kind of instruction is
40. P. Stolz, Clinical Experience in American Legal Education: Why Has It
Failed?

CLINICAL EDUCATION AND THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE FUTURE

54, 54 (E.

Kitch, ed. 1969).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 55.
43. See Chase, supra note 2, at 336-40.
44. Stolz, supra note 40, at 54 n.1.
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introduced under the same name while Eliot and Langdell are both still
on the scene, we might reasonably doubt the character of our analysis
to this point. Stolz indicates that his information comes from A.Z.
Reed's Present-Day Law Schools in the United States.45
References to Reed, however, reveals the lameness of Stolz's theorization. What Stoltz calls "legal clinics," Reed describes as a response
to the legal profession's concern for social service. He indicates that the
earliest manifestation of this interest "was the establishment of a 'Dispensary' by a law club of the University of Pennsylvania law school in
1893. Later, independent legal aid societies were started among the
students at Harvard and at several other schools." '46 Harvard's legal aid
society, Reed indicates, was begun in 1913 - not "about the turn of the
century" as Stolz indicates. 47 Were these legal aid societies "conceived
on analogy to the medical school clinic," as Stolz proposes? According
to The Centennial History of the Harvard Law School:
In 1913 the Legal Aid Bureau was formed, as part of the activity of
the Law School Society of Phillips Brooks House; it is now an entirely
independent organization. It offers some of the older students an opportunity of engaging in welfare work while at the same time they acquire
can be gained in
professional experience often more enlightening than
48
the specialized practice of the modern city office.
The legal aid societies would seem to have been modelled on private welfare and charitable organizations rather than clinical education
in medicine. The systematic and comprehensive organization of concrete and practical experience in the case method law school presents a
much sharper reflection of the clinical approach to medical instruction
than the work of legal aid societies, Stolz's "legal clinics." Indeed, the
attraction of legal aid work suggested by the law school's Centennial
History is not its compensation for the absence of clinical legal instruction in the law school, but rather its advantages over other forms and
45. See A. Reed, Present-Day Law Schools in the United States and Canada
(Carnegie Foundation Bulletin No. 21 (1928)).
46. Id. at 217.
47. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
48.

HARVARD

LAW

HARVARD LAW SCHOOL

SCHOOL ASSOCIATION,

CENTENNIAL

HISTORY

OF THE

1817-1917 at 151 (1917) (emphasis added).
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ways of acquiring "professional experience. '49 The law school sought to
provide its students with professional education, not professional experience, and the legal aid bureau's "older students" did not appear to confuse the two.
Stolz's second reply to his query regarding the "failure" of clinical
experience in legal education refers to the low repute of student legal
aid bureaus conceived as "teaching institutions" resulting from their
limitation "basically to the crisis needs of the very poor."5 0 Could the
problem be less that such clinical experience is not valued by many
legal educators than that such experience is not clinical in the context
of Eliot's transformation of modem professional education? Is such experience brought within the carefully administered process of professional transformation which is the essence of those programs sponsored
by Eliot and which liquidated the apprentice system? What Stolz actually describes is not the failure of clinical experience in legal education
but rather the ineffectual resurgence of apprenticeship within a modern
professional school system.
The modulated degree of "exposure to the real world of law practice," 51 which the case method has always represented, may simply
constitute the closest relationship to actual practice within which the
noviciate law student may be safely placed with a certain guarantee of
administrative control over the structure of professional education.
Moot courts and law clubs, actively promoted by Dean Langdell, have
long been a part of Harvard legal education and constitute, like the

case method classroom, a concrete and practical experience which can
be effectively controlled.5 2
Stolz's assertion that "practical experience" has ranked low among
the pedagogical values of American legal educators certainly does not
apply to the originators of the case method at Harvard, who gradually
foreclosed the lecture and exposition tradition within American legal
education. Professors Ames, Keener, Gray and Thayer 5s frequently

49. Id.
50. Stolz, supra note 40, at 55.
51. Id. note 40 and accompanying text.
52. See C. WARREN, 2 HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 327-31, 413-16
(1908). During the Langdell period, law clubs gradually replaced the moot courts as
the center of Harvard's oral advocacy program.
53. See id. at 419-27; Sutherland, supra note 29, at 162-299.
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found themselves defending the case method from an opposite claim:
the charge that the case method was too practical and specific to actual
adjudicated cases and the legal arguments advanced within them to be
useful. "This method of studying law," asserted New York attorney
James C. Carter in Langdell's defense,
by going to its original sources, is no royal road, no primrose path. It is
full of difficulties. It requires struggle. If there is anything which is calculated to try the human faculties in the highest degree it is to take up
the complicated facts of different cases; to separate the material from
the immaterial, the relevant from the irrelevant; to assign to each element its due weight and limitation and to give to different competing
principles and rules of law their due place in the conclusion that is to be
formed, and I know on the other hand of no greater intellectual gratification than those which follow from the solution in this way of the great
problems of the law as they successively present themselves."

Carter was convinced: the case method worked.
IV. SYSTEMATIC INSTRUCTION AND MODERN PROFESSIONALISM

The most recent, and perhaps most elaborate ever, statement of
the proposition that Langdell's main idea was that law must be considered a science is found in Professor Grant Gilmore's The Death of
Contract and The Ages of American Law. Without considering the
possibility that Langdell's major contribution was an institutionalization of the idea that modern professional education in law requires systematic instruction comparable to that in the sciences and clinical
medicine, Gilmore asserts:
Langdell seems to have been an essentially stupid man who, early in
his life, hit on one great idea to which, thereafter, he clung with all the
tenacity of genius. Langdell's idea evidently corresponded to the felt necessities of the time. However absurd, however mischievous, however
deeply rooted in error it may have been, Langdell's idea shaped our legal
thinking for fifty years.
54. Carter's comments, made at the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of
Harvard College celebration in Cambridge, are quoted in W.A. Keener, Methods of
Legal Education II, 1 YALE L.J. 147 (1892).
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Langdell's idea was that law is a science. . . . From that basic proposition several subsidiary propositions followed.
Ideologically, it followed that legal truth is a species of scientific
truth. The quality of scientific truth, as most nineteenth-century minds
understood it, is that once such a truth has been demonstrated, it endures. It is not subject to change without notice. It does not capriciously
turn into its own opposite. It is, like the mountain, there. 55
Gilmore seems to base his analysis upon an extremely limited sampling of Langdell's ideas. He suggests that "[a]part from the casebook
on Contracts (plus the Summary) and a second casebook on Sales
(1872), [Langdell] seems to have written little or nothing.""6 Although
it is true that Langdell rarely defended the case method of law teaching itself, his annual reports on the development of the Harvard Law
School between 1870 and 189557 encompass a greater number of total
pages than his Contracts casebook which, of course, was a collection of
case reports rather than original writing. Gilmore makes no mention of
these interesting reports.
In the major biographical essay on Langdell (to which Gilmore
does not refer), James Barr Ames5 8 spends two pages discussing (without exaggerating their impact) Langdell's books and essays, including
at least twelve articles in The Harvard Law Review. The last of these
constitutes an intriguing study of the relationship between law and society in nineteenth century Britain. 59 Langdell even published a short
history of the Harvard Law School between 1869 and 1894, the period

55. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42-43 (1977).
56. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 109 (1974).
57. See FORTY-SIxTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF HARVARD COLLEGE: 1870-1871 (1872) through ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE PRESIDENT AND TREASURER OF HARVARD COLLEGE 1894-95 (1896) Langdell's portion of these quite extensive reports on university life and politics as well as growth and development, always
begins: "Sir, - I beg to submit the following report upon the Law School for the
Id.
academic year _"
58.

J. AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY AND MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL ESSAYS

467-82 (1913).
59. Id. at 474-75. See C. Langdell, Dominant Opinions In England During The
Nineteenth Century In Relation To Legislation'AsIllustratedBy English Legislation,
Or The Absence Of It, During That Period, 19 HARV. L. REV. 151 (1906). See also
note 112 infra.
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In his sketch of the law school, Langdell discussed the following
changes in legal education which he conceived to be most significant:
(1) the development of a new course of study; (2) conferring degrees
only upon examination; (3) improvement of the library and appointment of a permanent librarian; (4) development of a new method of
study and instruction, utilizing casebooks rather than treatises; (5)
holding regular faculty meetings; (6) the gradual increase of tuition
fees; (7) establishment of examinations regulating advancement from
one year to the next; (8) hiring J.B. Ames as an assistant professor in
the law school while he was only a student; (9) establishment of the
distinction between ordinary and honor degrees; (10) final extension of
the degree program to three required years of study; (11) establishment
of entrance examinations for those without college degrees; (12) completion of Austin Hall; (13) founding of the Harvard Law School Association; (14) establishment of The HarvardLaw Review; (15) issuing a
complete catalogue of all the graduates of the law school; (16) listing
108 colleges from which prospective law degree candidates should have
graduated; (17) increase in the number of faculty and students in the
law school."'
The single most important change, Langdell seemed to believe,
was the establishment of law school teaching as a career in its own
right, as well as the hiring of Harvard graduates as law teachers not
only at Harvard but in schools across the country. Indeed, the professionalization of law teaching was a prerequisite to the realization of
Langdell's "main idea" (which he shared with Eliot); the development
of systematic and comprehensive, university-based professional education. Langdell argued that the law should be studied not from treatises
but directly and in a rigorous way from the reported case decisions
themselves. "The method," asserted Eliot,
was much derided at the start by lawyers who had been brought up on
treatises and commentaries on treatises; but it soon justified itself in a
conclusive way. After a few years it was demonstrated that young men
who had been thus trained to the practice of the law could make them60. C. Langdell, The Harvard Law School, 1869-1894, 2

THE HARV. GRADU-

490 (1893-1894).
Id. at 494-98.

ATES MAGAZINE

61.
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selves more useful to their seniors in the offices they entered than fresh
law graduates had ever been before, and than young men contemporaneously trained in other methods. There followed a rapid growth of the

Harvard Law School which has continued to this day, in spite of numerous restrictive measures which demanded better preparation for admisdegree in arts or
sion, more years of residence and finally a preliminary
62

science as a condition of entrance to the School.

Did these momentous changes occur in the wake of a new gospel,
a spreading faith in the scientific quality of law or was the transformation of the American legal profession at the heart of things?
The changes which were taking place in the practice of American
law toward the end of the nineteenth century were closely related to
the growth of industrialism and urbanism under the direction of corporate capitalism. The birth of new professions and the transformation of
older ones within the matrix of industrial society constitute, according
to sociologist Magali S. Larson, one aspect of the process of social
modernization. 'Most research analyses, Larson asserts,
implicitly or explicitly present professionalization as an instance of the
complex process of 'modernization.' For professions, the most significant
'modern' dimensions are the advance of science and cognitive rationality,
and the related rationalization and growing differentiation in the division
of labor. From this point of view, professions are typical products of
modern industrial society. The continuity of older professions with their
'pre-industrial' past is therefore more apparent than real.68
The effort to maintain continuity of appearance against the real
background of discontinuity and transformation provoked, by the beginning of the twentieth century, a crisis of self-image within the legal
profession. "In the opening decades of the century," historian Richard
Hofstadter points out, "the American legal profession was troubled by
an internal crisis, a crisis in self-respect precipitated by the conflict between the image of legal practice inherited from an earlier age of more
independent professionalism and the realities of modern commercial
62.

Eliot, supra note 7, at 202-03. See also C.

CONCRETE AND PRACTICAL IN MODERN EDUCATION

63.

ELIOT, THE TENDENCY TO THE

(1913).

Larson, supra note 1, at xvi.
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practice."
It is important to add that the movement away from what Hofstadter calls a "more independent professionalism" constituted a movement toward deployment of a model of "cognitive rationality" (e.g., the
spread of case method legal education as standarized professional training), and sharper internal stratification or what Larson describes as
"growing differentiation in the division of labor." 5
In Hofstadter's view, the older and more independent professionalism among attorneys had been characterized by lawyers whose status
and reputation derived from the quality of their courtroom advocacy
and broad learning; men of considerable public influence and power
within a widely remarked tradition of American statesmanship, whose
sense of public responsibility was bound up with a self-conception of
being officers of the court as well as agents of particular clients, and
who were members of a democratic profession, access to which was
open to virtually all as a kind of "natural right.""8 By the end of the
century, however, the status and fortune of leading members of the bar
came increasingly to depend upon effective counsel and advice rather
than courtroom forensics. The public influence of attorneys also resulted more from their close relationship to concentrations of private
capital rather than from having provided the rank and file of practicing
politicians. Lawyers saw themselves less and less as officers of the court
and increasingly (in the words of one troubled attorney) as "clerks on a
salary" to those paying the most generous retainers. And the development towards higher standards in the law schools and promulgation of
codes of ethical conduct in the new professional organizations signalled
both sharper distinctions between the various echelons within the
67
profession.
"At the turn of the century," Hofstadter argues,
lawyers as a group were far less homogeneous than they had been fifty
years before. The large, successful firms, which were beginning even then
to be called 'legal factories,' were headed by the wealthy, influential, and
normally very conservative minority of the profession that tended to be
64.
65.
66.
67.

R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 156 (1955).
See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
HOFSTADTER, supra note 64, at 157.
See id. at 156-64. See also Larson, supra note 1, at 166-77.
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most conspicuous in the Bar Associations.6 8
"There was a second echelon of lawyers," Hofstadter continues,
in small but well-established offices of the kind that flourished in smaller
cities; lawyers of this sort, who were commonly attached to and often
shared the outlook of new enterprisers or small businessmen, frequently
staffed and conducted local politics. A third echelon, consisting for the
most part of small partnerships or individual practitioners, usually carried on a catch-as-catch-can practice and eked out modest livings. As
the situation of the independent practitioners deteriorated, they often
drifted into ambulance-chasing and taking contingent fees. Much of the
talk in Bar Associations about improving legal ethics represented the unsympathetic efforts of the richer lawyers with corporate connections to
improve the reputation of the profession as a whole at the expense of
their weaker colleagues.6 9
Hofstadter's concluding sentence is quite important: it remained
necessary for elite lawyers to improve the reputation of the profession
"as a whole" in order to improve their own standing within public opinion. At the level of formal professional status, elite attorneys were indistinguishable from the very bottom rung of the professional hierarchy. This fact resulted from an important difference between the
formal organization of the American and English bars.
Legal historian J. Willard Hurst points out that the colonial
American bar had before it the example of England's distinction between a higher order of barristers or courtroom advocates and lower
echelon of solicitors or client-caretakers. 7 0 The barrister-solicitor distinction in England, according to Hurst,
brought the ablest practitioners together, to form the Inns of Court. Legal education was controlled by the members of the Inns, and these lawyers early began to specialize in advocacy, which was then the most desirable part of law practice. Despite its chance beginnings, the barristersolicitor distinction grew into a maze of social, legal, and economic

68.

HOFSTADTER,

supra note 64, at 157.

69. Id.
70. See

J.

HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 252-

54, 309-11 (1950).

Published by NSUWorks, 1981

23

Nova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 2
1346

Nova Law Journal

346

Nova Law Journal

elements.

5:1981 1
5:198 1 I

1

In Colonial Virginia, Massachusetts, and New Jersey, Hurst observes the initial American replication of the English bifurcation of formal status within the legal profession. But the combination of a highly
mobile class structure in the United States with the specific circumstances surrounding the Revolution (e.g., popular revulsion against the
English, the end of formal training for American lawyers at the Inns of
Court, hostility to leading members of the bar who had maintained
Royalist sympathies) broke up the early influence of local bar associations and professional groups. "In 1790," Hurst concludes, "the country was poor, scattered and sparsely settled, and engrossed in exploiting
its natural wealth; conditions would not allow law practice to develop
according to the costly etiquette of the peculiar English type of lawyers' specialization. 7 2
Indeed, we may even argue that (as Larson suggests) modem professionalism is so closely wedded to industrialization that the first efforts at professional organization in American law filed as consequence
of their prematurity in relation to social and economic conditions.
Thus, if the nineteenth century (in its industrial phase) is marked by
waves of professionalization, it is also (in its pre-industrial phase)
marked by waves of deprofessionalization which constitute the
equivalent in the United States of decolonization in the professions.
This is the sort of historical contour outlined by Robert H. Wiebe, who
suggests that "[e]arly in the nineteenth century educational and apprenticeship requirements had still restricted the practice of law in
many parts of the East."'73
"As in medicine," continues Wiebe,
deprofessionalization moved apace in the second quarter of the century,
when democratized, decentralized admission to the bar demolished practically all standards. Training passed from the colleges to a convenient
law office, and along with thousands of others, John Peter Altgeld, an
indifferent student, passed the bar examination after reading for a few
months in his spare time. A great many practiced law as a sideline. ...
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 309-10.
Id. at 310.
R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877-1920 at 116 (1967).
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It was [an elite of legal experts], partly to honor themselves, partly to
work for higher standards, who in the seventies began organizing city
and state bar associations, capped in 1878 by the American Bar Association. What started gradually became a flood after 1890. The expanding
need for carefully trained lawyers shifted education back to the classroom, where in the better schools the quality of instruction rose
rapidly. .. 7
If the shift in legal education brought law students into the classrooms of the rising university professional schools (increasingly adopting the case method of instruction), and if the shift in professional organization brought attorneys in increasing numbers within city and
state bar associations, the shift in legal practice itself brought greater
numbers of lawyers into the employment of large corporations and
financial institutions. It was true, of course, that as early as the 1850's
attorneys such as Richard Blatchford had brought business to their
firms from corporations involved with railroad consolidation or other
commercial transactions.75 But it was not until the Civil War that corporations, in conjunction with expanding transport and communications
infrastructures and the growth of great cities, began to provide the major retainers for America's elite lawyers.
The concentration of industrial and financial power which accompanied the growth of corporate capitalism transformed the conventional
practice of estate planning into a major business speciality and both
patent and personal injury law became of sufficient importance to warrant their own practicing bars.7
The gradual expansion of government regulation of private corporate activity during the Progressive period 77 created challenging work
for attorneys who could safely guide their clients through the statutory
obstacle course. "Within this purely professional frame of reference,"
writes Hurst, "the most basic change in the nature of lawyers' professional work was the shift in emphasis from advocacy to counseling...
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 116-17.
See HURST, supra note 70, at 298.
Id. at 298-99.
See HOFSTADTER, supra note 64. See also G.

KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF
CONSERvATIsM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916 (1963); J.
WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE 1900-1918 (1968).
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The years after 1870 showed a more matter-of-fact attitude, a prevailing distaste for litigation as a costly luxury, and increasing effort to use
law and lawyers preventively. 7 8
The implication of these changes for legal education was not that
law students should be graduated as patent or railroad lawyers, or as
experts in various kinds of "legal prevention." What rising standards
for the profession "as a whole" and legitimation of stratification within
the profession on the basis of competence and credentialism meant was
that the older lecture system of instruction in the schools as well as the
apprentice system (or any system, for that matter) outside the schools
could not be effective. The broad sweep of these changes is explained
by Magali Larson:
[T]he passage from restricted monopolies of practice to the organization and control of expanded and competitive markets was a necessary
one for the professional sectors of the middle class, seeking to improve
their position in the emergent stratification systems of capitalist society.
Their task presupposed the abandonment - deliberate or involuntary - of
the restrictive corporate warrants of professional credibility. It tended
toward the reconstruction of monopoly on the universalistic principles
dictated by the new dominant ideology. The crowning of this monopolistic project appears to be a set of legally enforced monopolies of practice.
However, the actual effectiveness of such sanctions depends on the parallel construction of a 'monopoly of credibility' with the larger public. The
conquest of official privilege and public favor was, for the professions, a
double external task of ideological persuasion, which had an internal
precondition: the unification of the corresponding areas of the social division of labor under the direction of a leading group of professional
79
reformers.
And with special relevance to the emergence after 1870 of the case
method law school, Larson concludes: "The crucial means for this unification, and therefore the concrete core of the professions' organizational task, was systematic training - or, in my terms, the standardized
and centralized production of professional producers." 8 0 The case
method (which made possible for the first time the standardized in78.

79.

supra note 70, at 302.
Larson, supra note 1, at 16-17.
HURST,

80. Id. at 17.
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struction of large numbers of students) in the hands of full-time professional law teachers secured a spectacular centralization of the professional training of attorneys. It is thus hardly surprising that Langdell,
as we have seen, regarded the initiation of the law teaching profession
at Harvard to be of singular importance. Indeed, even beyond the project of general standardization for the profession as a whole, a relative
handful of prominent law professors spread through a number of prestigious university law schools could train the leading members of bench
and bar for generations."1
At a time when enrollments were still limited to handfuls of students and university professional schools were struggling to stay alive,
Charles Eliot already perceived the case method's potential as an instrument of standardization and controlled expansion. "It should be the
aim of a University's Law School," he wrote in 1874-75, "to train
young men of good preliminary education and average ability, taken by
the hundred. . ."I"

".

The rigorous training of large numbers of law

students, who would carry with them the network of professional relations developed in Cambridge, remained a trademark of the Harvard
Law School long after Eliot and Langdell had turned the responsibility
of educational leadership to their successors.
V. HARVARD ON THE OFFENSIVE
If, in retrospect, the case method law school appears to be the almost inevitable solution to the problem of "standardized and centralized production of professional producers"83 confronted by the American legal profession during its period of historic "modernization,""
nothing was quite so simple or transparent to American lawyers and
educators in 1870. On the contrary, Eliot and Langdell initially met
considerable opposition to their reform program. Any notion of a kind
of fatalistic determination by which the social and structural transfor81. See Langdell, supra note 60. See also the interesting discussion in GILMORE,
supra note 55, at 57-58 and J. Auerbach, Scientific Expertise: The Triumph of the
New Professoriat, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA 74-101 (1976).
82. Warren, supra note 52, at 396-97 (quoting C. Eliot).
83. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
84. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.

Published by NSUWorks, 1981

27

Nova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 2
350

Nova Law Journal

5:1981

mation of the professions automatically precipitated a rationalization of
the professional training programs would entirely exclude the actual
factor of human agency, the intervention by relatively autonomous individuals within the movement of things. History may present a certain
configuration of circumstances, but that totality must still be accurately
comprehended by willful individuals capable of initiating change.
When considering the role of human agency in social transformation,
theorist Antonia Gramsci remarked:
Real will is disguised as an act of faith, a sure rationality of history,
a primitive and empirical form of impassioned finalism which appear as
a substitute for the predestination, providence etc., of the confessional
religions. We must insist on the fact that even in such cases there exists
in reality a strong active will. .

.

. We must stress the fact that fatalism

has only been a cover by the weak for an active and real will. This is
why it is always necessary to show the futility of mechanical determinism, which, explicable as a naive philosphy of the masses, becomes a
cause of passivity, of imbecile self-sufficiency, when it is made into a
reflective and coherent philosopy on the part of the intellectuals .... 85
Neither Eliot nor Langdell were willing to leave the orchestration
of modern American legal education to providence, and their pedagogy
was a reaction against the "imbecile self-sufficiency" of apologists for
the educational status-quo.
Their self-consciousness regarding the relationship between a restructuring of American legal education and the transformation of the
legal profession itself is clearly revealed in their annual reports,8 6 particularly Langdell's reports on the condition of the law school for the
years 1876-77 and 1880-81.
Beyond recapitulating the enrollment and financial figures for the
year in relation to previous years, Langdell's main focus in his annual
report for 1876-77 was the peculiar situation of law in relation to the
other professional disciplines and how it had led Harvard into a serious
conflict with the state (i.e., public authority, particularly state courts
85. L. ALTHUssER, FOR MARX 105 (1977) (quoting A. Gamisci, I/ Materialismo Storico E La Filosofia De Benedetto Croce, 2 OPERE 13-14; THE MODERN
PRINcE

86.

69-70).
See note 57 supra.
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and legislatures) regarding the future of legal education. Langdell referred to the fact that while admission to the clerical, medical, and
scientific professions was controlled by the professions themselves, admission to the legal profession was controlled by the state which gave
neither "recognition [n]or countenance"' 7 to the Harvard Law School.
The only "privilege" 88 the school received, even in Massachusetts, was
that of having time spent by a student in the school accepted as an
equivalent to the same amount spent as an apprentice in a lawyer's
office.
Although Langdell pointed to recent movements in New York and
Massachusetts to raise standards of admission to the legal profession,
he was worried by the fact that such movements were not under the
control of the law schools nor designed to make university legal education essential to preparation for the bar. "[N]either this Law School
nor any other," stated Langdell, "has participated at all in this movement, nor directly exercised any influence over it; nor was it in any
degree the aim or object of the movement either to support and
strengthen law schools, or to make use of them in furtherance of the
objects in view." 8 9
The special situation of the legal profession was precipitated not
only by its subordination to state control of admissions but the kind of
control enforced which represented a special way of interpreting the
relation of the American to the English legal profession. "The true
cause" of the problem, asserted Langdell,
will be found primarily in the fact that the American lawyer represents
two professions, which, in their nature, are distinct, which call into exercise different qualities of mind and character, and which require different kinds and degrees of education and training for their successful pursuit; namely, the professions of attorney and counsellor respectively. One
reason why these two professions have always been pursued in this country by the same persons, undoubtedly is that they have generally been
supposed to be one and the same profession. Sometimes, indeed, it is
assumed that a lawyer is only an attorney, and at other times that he is
87.

C. Langdell, Annual Report on the Law School, FIFrY-SEcoN.-D
1876-77 at 87 (1878).
Id.
Id. at 87-88.

ANNUAL

REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF HARVARD COLLEGE

88.
89.
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only a counsellor; but the fact is seldom intelligently recognized that he
is both. Moreover, the State has commonly treated the legal profession,
especially as regards every thing relating to the preparation for it and
the admission into it, as if its members were attorneys merely; and this
view has not been regarded with disfavor by the profession itself, for the
idea is deeply rooted that every young man should begin as an attorney
merely, and that age and experience alone are a sufficient warrant for
assuming the position of a counsellor. Accordingly, our States, in dealing
with the legal profession, have copied the English practice relating to
attorneys. 9o
The distinction which Langdell draws between attorneys and counsellors is, of course, identical to the English distinction between solicitors and barristers (Langdell uses the words "counsellor" and "barrister" interchangeably).91 What is extraordinary is Langdell's assertion
that the two are separate "in their natures," and not merely in England. He does not deny that the two "professions" of attorney and
counsellor have been pursued in the United States "by the same persons," but he implies that this practice confuses two quite different
legal roles.
The reason that Langdell offers for the two professions having
been pursued in the United States by the same persons "isthat they
have generally been supposed to be one and the same profession." 92 But
why, then, the general supposition in favor of a formally unified legal
profession in America? Langdell does not pursue the historical contour
beyond this initial tautology. He is more interested in exploring the
implications of confusing the two professional identities.
The most serious consequence would appear to be adoption on the
part of the State of the English practice relating to attorneys. In its
initial form, this practice provides the basic justification for State control over admission to the profession. The State had no claim over the
loyalty of barristers who were subordinate only to their colleges from
which they were "called" to the law. Beyond this necessary first step,
treating all American lawyers like members of the lower order in the
English profession resulted in dramatically limited restrictions upon
90. Id. at 88.
91. Id. at 88-90.
92. Id. at 88.
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ways of preparing for the American bar.
Langdell obviously admired the independence of the English
barrister,
[who] is not an officer of the courts, and the latter have neither more nor
less authority over him than they have over litigants who conduct their
own causes without the assistance of counsel. Such being the status of
English barristers, it is needless to -say that there is nothing analogous to
it in the condition of the legal profession in this country. On the other
hand, if we inquire into the status of attorneys in England, we shall find
ourselves on familiar ground. While barristers are supposed to constitute
a learned and liberal profession of the highest grade, attorneys have always been regarded and treated more as artisans than as professional
men; and their chief marks of distinction from the public at large, so far
as regards their legal status, consist in their receiving their appointment
from the State, in their being liable to have this appointment revoked at
any moment, and in their being constantly subject to the surveillance of

the courts.

...

93

If there was a gradual development within the upper echelons of
the American legal profession of a shift from predominantly advocacy
practice to that of counsel and legal prevention, there never developed
in the American legal profession (even at the corporate firm level) a
functional split equivalent to that between solicitors and barristers in
England. Indeed, in regard to practical lawyering functions, J. Willard
Hurst argues:
In the nineteenth century the advocate emerged as the model of the
leader of the bar in the United States, and successful firms typically included a 'court' lawyer and an 'office' lawyer. Such a partnership was
itself a development that differed basically from the English pattern.
Neither in fact nor in form was the advocate in this country confined, as
was the English barrister, to appearing in court and giving 'opinions.'
After 1870 leadership at the bar in the United States went to men
who more resembled the solicitor. But, as in the early case of the advocate, these 'solicitors' were not confined to the role that English etiquette
would have assigned them. In such men as Elihu Root or Louis D. Brandeis the bar of the United States developed a type of leader peculiarly its

93. Id. at 89.
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own. Such men94mingled the roles of barrister, solicitor, business adviser,
and statesman.
In short, the English categories so poorly fit the American reality
that the shift from advocacy to counsel functions might just as well be
designated as a shift from "counsellor" (or barrister) to "solicitor," so
long as one spoke in terms of specific functions performed rather than
in terms of relative access to official privilege. But it is precisely the
latter which was of paramount concern to Dean Langdell. Indeed, his
whole conception of the distinction "in their nature" between attorneys
and counsellors revolved not upon differences in function but rather
upon distinctions in social background, formal status, and recognized
privilege.
It was "different qualities of mind and character" which required
"different kinds and degrees of education and training"9 5 which attracted Langdell to the English professional categories. Echoing Foucault's comparison of doctors educated through clinical experience to
health officers trained through apprenticeship, 96 it was the English distinction between a "learned and liberal profession of the highest grade"
and a lower order "treated more as artisans than as professional
men" 97 to which Langdell was drawn, like a moth to the luminous gaslamps of Victorian English stability. And it was England which revealed most strikingly the ultimate rewards of distinguishing between
art and science, between apprenticeship and professional education:
Indeed, it is doubtful if ever, in any country, any profession has occupied a position so exalted as the higher branch of the legal profession
in England. In consequence of a very highly centralized judicial system,
and in consequence of the profession being divided by law into two
branches (counsel and attorneys), all the members of the higher branch,
at least with few exceptions, reside in the metropolis and form a large,
compact, distinguished, and influential body of men, inheriting great traditions, endowed with great privileges, and clothed with great powers, with the power, among others, of determining, without appeal, what new
members shall be admitted into the body, and whether existing members
94. HURST, supra note 70,
95. See note 90 supra and
96. See note 11 supra and
97. See note 93 supra and
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shall remain in it, and upon what terms. I say without appeal; for,
though the judges have a visitorial power over the body, yet the judges
are all taken from the body and continue to be members of it. Every
member of this body, on the one hand, feels the influence, shares the
advantages, and enjoys the support and protection of the entire body,
and, on the other hand, has all the members of the body to compete
with; and upon those who succeed in struggling to the front the State
showers its honors and rewards to an extent absolutely unprecedented.
Under such a system, legal education will take care of itself in a great
measure, at least so far as the interests of the public are concerned. In
this country, on the other hand, the State has, upon the whole, done its
best to reduce the legal profession to the level of an ordinary pursuit; it
has neither done anything for it, nor permitted it as a body to do anything for itself.98
If the State would not formally distinguish and endow an upper
echelon of American lawyers, then that professional project would be
carried forward by "the body" itself or, at least, a leadership cadre
from within it. At the level of professional training, this meant that law
schools would have to take the initiative themselves (with whatever risk
of declining enrollments) in raising standards and providing national
and systematic (rather than local or arbitrary) professional education.
At the level of professional organization, this meant that lawyers would
have to be persuaded of the potential influence which arose from common association. "The profession does not constitute one organized
body at all;" asserted Langdell, "and if it can be said to have any organized bodies within it, they are of the slightest and feeblest description, and do not embrace respectively more than a single city or
county." 99
Langdell, of course, did not have long to wait for the nascent bar
associations to begin to discover their strength and assert their demands for professional self-regulation. 100 What he and Eliot had realized (somewhat ahead of everyone else) was the necessary relationship
between modem professionalism and the educational process through
which new members of the professions would be recruited and trained,
C. Langdell, Annual Report on the Law School, ANNUAL REPORTS
1880-81 at 80-81 (1881).
99. Id. at 81.
100. See, e.g., HURST, supra note 70 and Auerbach, supra note 81.
98.

OF THE

PRESIDENT AND TREASURER OF HARVARD COLLEGE
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then funnelled into various organized strata within the profession. "The
only sure way of raising the professional standard," argued Langdell,
"is by raising the standard of legal attainments, education, and character in the men by whom the profession is recruited, or at least in the
better class of them."101 And it was the case method law school elaborated at Harvard during this period which proved the most effective
device for "raising the standard of legal attainments" among those who
would assume new roles in determining "what new members shall be
°
admitted into the body. 102
The anachronistic and inefficient apprentice system could never
provide the "standardized and centralized production of professional
producers" required by modern professionalism. "In short," Langdell
claimed, retaining his distinction between artisans and professionals:
while a lawyer's office is the only place in which an expert attorney can
be made, it cannot be too clearly understood that it is not a fit place in
which to learn anything relating to the profession of a counsellor or advocate. .

.

. The art of the attorney, being in its nature local, should be

acquired in the place where it is to be practised; while the science of the
advocate, being confined within no narrower limits than the system of
English and American law, may be best acquired, other things being
equal, in the place where that system of law is studied and taught most
exclusively as a science, i.e., exclusively of every thing local, temporary,
or arbitrary. This consideration alone is sufficient to settle conclusively
the destiny of this school; and accordingly, from the time of its first establishment on its present basis, the policy has been uniformly declared
and acted upon of making it national, not local. To depart from this
policy voluntarily would be madness; to be forced to depart from it
would be ruin."'
Just as Eliot's contribution to modern professional education consisted of a struggle on two fronts (against the expository lecture tradition in the schools and against the independent apprenticeship outside
the schools), 104 the survival of the Harvard Law School (by the 1870s
required a struggle against both madness and ruin, against (respec101.

Langdell, supra note 98, at 82.

102.

Id. at 80-81.

103.
104.

Langdell, supra note 87, at 91-92.
See text at sections I and II supra.
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tively) the local bar and the state. This involved a defense of the "study
of law as a science" as much in terms of what it excluded ("everything
local, temporary, and arbitrary") as what it included (the systematic
study of individual case reports).
Defending the case method from voluntary abandonment under
pressure included convincing the local bar of its superiority to the apprentice system. Additionally, it meant preservation and enhancement
(against parochial interests) of Harvard as a national law school preparing lawyers for practice in New York, the Middle West, and
throughout the country, rather than only in Boston or other New England communities.
Defending the case method from forced abandonment at Harvard
meant convincing the state (particularly New York) to admit Harvard
Law School graduates to licensed practice on the same basis as graduates of state schools. If individual states gave preference in admission
to the bar (through a variety of means including reduction of standards) to graduates of state schools, then students would attend law
school where they planned to practice. This would not only defeat
Harvard's national aspirations and tend to reduce the capacity of the
profession to develop national organizations, but it would specifically
reduce the numbers of students planning to practice in New York City
who would study for a law degree at Harvard. Eliot and Langdell go to
great lengths in their annual reports to underscore their sense of propriety in requesting equal treatment from the states: it was not a question
of anyone favoring Harvard but rather of the state merely permitting
the legal profession (with Harvard playing a leadership role) to improve its own standards and practices. "The Law School," Langdell
indicated,
therefore, has all the reasons for continuing its present policy that it has
for continuing to exist; and what is required, therefore, is that the State
should realize its need of the service which the Law School is seeking to
render it, and that it should recognize in the Law School (and in institutions of similar character and aims) an instrument (and the only one
within its reach) by which this service can be secured without expense or
charge to the public. All that the School asks of the State, in the way of
action, is that it give to candidates for the legal profession the option of
preparing themselves for its higher branch, and that it recognize an institution which furnishes the means and facilities for such preparation as
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doing a national and not a local work.10 5
Did Harvard Law School under Eliot and Langdell prepare students for the "higher branch" of the profession because, at Harvard,
law was taught and studied as a science? Or did Langdell consider the
case method "scientific" because it was the best means of training professionals, as opposed to mere "attorneys"? Did case method study in a
national law school exclude "everything local, temporary, and arbitrary" because it was taught as a science, or was the reverse true?
Langell's principal commitment was to the construction of a firstclass professional law school which would contribute to the standardized and centralized production of upper echelon lawyers. He seemed
willing to recruit the language of science, or of England's professional
traditions, and impose them upon the ensemble of immediate circumstances and options which Harvard confronted, always with his goals
clearly in view. Indeed, without elaboration, Langdell asserted that the
development of national law schools and the consolidation of power
within national professsional organizations constituted a service to the
state (without mentioning the profession itself) for which the state
should be grateful because the public was not being charged. Obviously, Langdell was single-minded in his faith in the professional
project.
In his annual report for 1876-77, Langdell stated:
The difficulty of examining in a given subject is in proportion to the
difficulty of teaching it; and there can be no doubt that English and
American law is one of the most difficult subjects to teach. The opinion
has, indeed, been prevalent that it is incapable of being taught as a science; and, though the correctness of this opinion will not be admitted by
those who represent this School, it may be supported by plausible arguments. Law has not the demonstrative certainty of mathematics; nor
does one's knowledge of it admit of many simple and easy tests, as in
case of a dead or foreign language; nor does it acknowledge truth as its
ultimate test and standard,like natural science; nor is our law embodied
in a written text, which is to be studied and expounded, as is the case
with the Roman law and with some foreign systems. Finally, our law has
not any long-established and generally recognized traditions which will
105.

Langdell, supra note 87, at 92.
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indicate to the examiner what his examination ought to be, and to the
student what it will be; .. .10
Situated within Grant Gilmore's theoretical outline of the development of American law, Christopher Langdell would appear to be (on
the basis of the statement above) an anti-Langdellian, crypto-Legal
Realist. The one idea to which Gilmore leads us to believe Langdell
will cling tenaciously, the Harvard Dean hurls to the winds. How can
such things be?
In fact, Langdell was once again confronted with a challenge to
the professional project being developed at the Harvard Law School.
The progressive development of state requirements regarding legal education ("making a reasonably long period of pupilage a sine qua non of
admission to the profession")10 7 appeared threatened by the idea that a
sufficiently objective and scientific bar admissions examination could be
administered that would provide entry to the profession for those who
were qualified and would reject those who were not, rendering unnecessary any reference to whether or not the candidate had studied in a law
school.
Here, for the first time, the "law as science" philosophy (which
Langdell had deployed so effectively in distinguishing apprenticeship
from professional education) suddenly (borrowing Gilmore's phrase)
"turned into its opposite"'10 8 and cut directly against the elaboration of
university-based, three-year professional schools as the heart of the professional project's initiation program. And, in a stroke, Langdell effectively abandons the philosophy. To be sure, the weight of his "other"
position rests heavily enough upon his words that he goes to the trouble
of finessing the discontinuity ("though the correctness of this opinion
will not be admitted by those who represent this School," etc.). 10 Nevertheless, there can be no mistaking Langdell's intention: he seeks to
downplay the presumed identity between law and science sufficiently
that no argument can be advanced in behalf of passing "scientific" examinations as the exclusive prerequisite to admission to the legal
profession.
106. Id. at 96-97 (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 95.

108. See

GILMORE,

note 55 supra and accompanying text.

109. See note 106 supra and accompanying text.
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In conclusion, at times Langdell makes scientific knowledge analogous to systematic (as in the German sense of Wissenschaft, knowledge
which can be studied systematically) 10 and legitimately describes the
case method as scientific study because the case method law school (in
relation to the old lecture academies and the apprentice system) constituted systematic and standardized professional training. At other times,
he leaves room for a different relation between law and science to be
read into his words, one where the analogy to the rigour of the physical
sciences seems implied. But as soon as it appears such a reading may
jeopardize the developing professional project at the Harvard Law
School, the "law as science" position is dramatically undercut.
This conclusion is reflected in relation to the broader structure of
nineteenth century American legal development by Professor Morton
Horwitz:
Perry Miller has shown the dominance of the equation of law with
science in all antebellum legal theorizing. Except for the identification of
'science' with systematization and classification, however, there is no coherent content or methodology to be found in these persistent claims to
the scientific character of law. What does seem extremely clear, nevertheless, is that the attempt to place law under the banner of 'science' was
designed to separate politics from law, subjectivity from objectivity, and
laymen's reasoning from professional reasoning." 1
Thus, Eliot and Langdell's "subjective" vision of how the American legal profession should be organized (and what methods should be
employed to secure professionalization in the schools) could be made to
appear "objective" and (at least in theory) appeal to the modern mind,
by characterizing the case method law school as a scientific enterprise.
But a somewhat different (and equally subjective) vision of the legal
profession, promoted by state courts or legislatures, could just as readily be made to appear "objective" and above politics through utilization
of "scientific" bar examinations to determine admission to the profession. In that instance, Langdell was as adroit as Professor Gilmore in
debunking an easy identification of law with the physical sciences. "A
110. See R.W. FRIEDRICHS, A SOCIOLOGY
111. M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION
257 (1977).
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better symbol could hardly be found;" suggests Gilmore, "if Langdell
had not existed, we would have had to invent him." 11 2 Langdell did
exist, of course. But that did not prevent Professor Gilmore from inventing him anyway.
VI. LEGAL EDUCATION REGARDED As A SOCIAL RELATION
It is reasonable to argue that Charles Eliot and Christopher Langdell were at times willing to associate law with science as a kind of
rhetorical device, clever salesmanship on the part of premier educational entrepreneurs.11 3 Obviously, they were also capable of regarding
112. GILMORE, supra note 55, at 42.
113. Besides its genuine contributions to intellectual argument, Darwinism
was also used as a popular rhetorical device. Though it might explain nothing, intellectuals found that an illusion to the theory of evolution was an
interesting way to say something quite ordinary, or to provide a scientific
explanation for change. In his fascinating essay Individualism and Collectivism, for example, Charles W. Eliot of Harvard used the concept of a
biological sport - a departure from predictable heredity - to explain how an
intelligent student might have poorly educated, lower-class parents.
J. GILBERT,

DESIGNING THE INDUSTRIAL STATE: THE INTELLECTUAL PURSUIT OF COLLECTIVISM IN AMERICA 1880-1940 at 45 (1972).

The chapter of Dicey's Law and Public Opinion described by Langdell as most
clearly belonging in a "law book" includes a warning against overstating the law's relation to science similar to Langdell's own disclaimer quoted in the text accompanying
note 106 supra.
If one may be allowed to apply the terms of logic to law, one is tempted to
assert that judicial legislation proceeds by a process of induction, whilst parliamentary legislation proceeds, or may proceed, by a process of deduction. This
contrast contains an element of truth. . . but the suggested contrast, unless its
limits be very carefully kept in mind, is apt to be delusive. The Courts no doubt
do not begin by laying down a general principle, but then a great deal of their
best work consists in drawing out the conclusions deducible from well-established
principles, and has therefore a deductive character. . . ordinary judicial legislation is logical, the best judicial legislation is scientific.
A.V. DICEY, LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND 370, n.1 (2d ed. 1962).

If much of legal realism contends that courts do, indeed, often argue from predetermined principles or bias, Dicey has broken sufficiently in his analysis with any
"delusive" belief in the inductive science of law that Gilmore's Langdell should reasonably be expected to respond with angry disagreement. Instead, Langdell praises Dicey's
social-historical orientation and concludes: "Any American who wishes to know the
England of the nineteenth century as if he were a native will find in Professor Dicey,
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legal education at Harvard as a science precisely because it was systematic professional preparation of counsellors who would join a "compact, distinguished, and influential body of men" 114 - just the opposite
of merely artisan training turning out legal handicrafters like wooden
tops.
But that is not what is important. In the end, it does not make
much difference exactly how or why Eliot and Langdell regarded law
as science. Indeed, for our purposes, it is not even necessary to decide
whether the equation law equals science is true.11 5 Our analysis must
be carried out on a different level. Recall Professor Gilmore's focus
upon an ideological demystification of Langdellian scientism. Yet why
was Langdell so successful? Gilmore hardly seems interested. He asserts that "Langdell's idea evidently corresponded to the felt necessities
of the time," ' 6 and adds that
[s]ooner or later a Blackstone or a Langdell appears .... If a Black-

stone or a Langdell comes at the right time, he will be heard and his
words will, for a generation, be devoutly believed: his message is a comforting one and ought to be true even if it is not. Since Langdell was
heard and was believed, he evidently came at the right time.'
From the point of view of serious social thought, nothing is "evidently" or obviously correct and virtually nothing can be relied upon to
happen "sooner or later." No explanation of social reality makes any
sense absent reference to the concrete structure of social relations. "In
other words," asserts Pashukanis,
we must determine whether or not legal categories are such objective
forms of thought (objective for an historically specific society) which correspond to objective social relationships. Consequently, our question is: is
it possible to understand law as a social relationshipin the same sense

who is a worthy successor of Blackstone, an incomparable instructor." Langdell, supra
note 59, at 167. See also E.J. HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF CAPITAL 1848-1875, at 251-76
(1976).
114. See Langdell, note 98 supra and accompanying text.
115. For brief but convincing arguments that it isn't, see W. SEAGLE, THE
QUEST FOR LAW 13-15 (1941) and R. POUND, 2 JURISPRUDENCE § 64 (1959).
116. GILMORE, supra note 55, at 42.
117. Id. at 64.
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in which Marx termed capital a social relationship?Such a statement of

the question pre-empts reference to the ideological nature of law, and all
our consideration is transferred to an entirely different level. 118
Therefore, it is necessary to conceive the theorization of "law as
science" as an objective form of thought with reference to objective
social relations. And it is the correspondence between the social relations of the American legal profession and categories of discourse about
professionalism and legal education which must be explained.

118. PASHUKANIS: SELECTED WRITINGS ON MARXISM AND LAW 55 (P. Beirne &
R. Sharlet, eds. 1980). See E.J. Hobsbawm, From Social History to the History of
Society, DAEDALUS 20-45 (Winter, 1971); L. GOLDMANN, CULTURAL CREATION IN
MODERN SOCIETY 76-88 (1976); M. AGErrA, A THEORY OF CAPITALIST REGULATION: THE U.S. EXPERIENCE (1979).

Published by NSUWorks, 1981

41

